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THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” CONTROVERSY IN
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES
Lauren Fowler*
Federal and state administrative agencies increasingly advance public
health goals through the use of mandatory disclosures, like warning labels
on cigarettes, that are intended to both inform and influence consumer
decisions.
However, the standard for determining whether these
requirements violate a commercial speaker’s First Amendment rights is
unsettled. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted a test that defers to the government’s determination that the
compelled disclosure of “factual and uncontroversial information” is
justified. Since Zauderer was decided, lower courts have disagreed about the
meaning of “uncontroversial.” A recent Supreme Court case, National
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), may have resolved
the debate by treating “uncontroversial” as a requirement that a disclosure
not relate to a controversial subject matter. In doing so, the Court diverged
from two interpretations commonly adopted by lower courts: that
“uncontroversial” refers to the factual accuracy of the disclosed information
or to the underlying ideology.
This Note illustrates the public health implications of these various
interpretations in the context of an ongoing international debate over the
benefits of breastfeeding and mandatory disclosures with respect to infant
formula. It argues that the Court’s position in NIFLA poses a significant
obstacle to government efforts to protect public health and ignores
Zauderer’s firm grounding in listeners’ informational interests. Factual
accuracy more appropriately limits Zauderer’s scope. Heightened scrutiny
should only apply if the government compels a commercial speaker to convey
opinion. While concerns about the overuse of warnings for remote or
unsubstantiated risks are well-founded, this issue may be addressed by
evaluating whether a particular disclosure fails Zauderer review as
“unjustified or unduly burdensome.” This framework for compelled
disclosures is more strongly supported by the text of Zauderer itself, and it
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would grant proper deference to a legislature’s policy determination that
potential health risks justify a disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2018, the New York Times reported that U.S. delegates to a United
Nations health assembly threatened to impose trade sanctions and withdraw
military aid from Ecuador to defeat a resolution promoting breastfeeding.1
Despite these threats, the World Health Assembly (WHA)2 passed the
resolution on May 26, 2018, which urged member states to “increase
investment” in measures to “protect[], promot[e], . . . and support”
breastfeeding and to implement or strengthen their implementation of legal
measures incorporating the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk
Substitutes (the “Code”)3 and other “evidence-based recommendations.”4
Public health officials and foreign diplomats were “stunned” by the United
States’s opposition to the resolution, which they described as a “marked
contrast” to President Obama’s general support of the long-established policy
of the World Health Organization (WHO) in favor of promoting
breastfeeding.5 The New York Times claimed that the American delegation
had “embrac[ed] the interests of infant formula manufacturers.”6
However, a spokesperson from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) characterized the American delegation’s position
differently: “The issues being debated were not about whether one supports
breastfeeding . . . . The United States was fighting to protect women’s

1. Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Breast-Feeding Resolution by U.S. Stuns World Health
Officials, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/health/worldhealth-breastfeeding-ecuador-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V4RP-LNBE]. In response to the
threats, Ecuador abandoned its plan to introduce the resolution. Id. Russia ultimately
introduced the resolution. Id. However, the United States successfully negotiated for the
removal of language calling on the World Health Organization to provide technical support to
member states trying to end the “inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young
children.” Id.
2. The WHA is “the decision-making body” of the World Health Organization. World
Health Assembly, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en
[https://perma.cc/XRC8-GDXK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
3. The International Code of Breast-Milk Substitutes is a “set of recommendations to
regulate the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, feeding bottles and teats,” adopted by the
WHA in 1981. World Health Org. [WHO], The International Code of Marketing of BreastMilk Substitutes: Frequently Asked Questions, at 2 (2017) [hereinafter Code FAQ],
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/254911/WHO-NMH-NHD-17.1-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E667-WEHT]. The United States was the only country to vote against the
Code in 1981, “after an intense lobbying campaign” by American infant formula
manufacturers. Carolyn Y. Johnson & Amanda Erickson, U.S. Effort to Weaken an
International Breast-Feeding Resolution Has a Long History, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/07/09/u-s-effort-to-weakenan-international-breast-feeding-resolution-has-a-long-history [http://perma.cc/jsn6-mcsw].
4. World Health Assembly [WHA], Infant and Young Child Feeding, at 2,
WHA71.9 (May 26, 2018), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71/A71_R9-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NG2N-EZMK].
5. Jacobs, supra note 1.
6. Id.; see also Johnson & Erickson, supra note 3 (reporting that the infant formula
industry heavily lobbied the U.S. delegation in Switzerland, according to an anonymous
source).
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abilities to make the best choices for the nutrition of their babies.”7 The
spokesperson stated that women should not be stigmatized for being unable
to breastfeed or denied information about breastfeeding alternatives.8
Often, however, women lack information about risks associated with those
alternatives. For instance, studies suggest that many American mothers do
not believe that formula-fed infants are more likely to get sick than breastfed
infants,9 despite strong consensus among public health experts to the
contrary.10 One legal measure urged by the WHO could address the
information gap: a requirement that infant formula labels provide
information about the benefits of breastfeeding and the “dangers associated
with the unnecessary or improper use of infant formula.”11 This particular
regulatory technique of advancing public health goals through mandatory
disclosures is increasingly common.12 However, the constitutionality of
these disclosures is unsettled.13
Mandatory disclosures implicate the First Amendment, either directly or
indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment.14 And while courts usually
apply strict scrutiny to compelled speech and intermediate scrutiny to
restrictions on commercial speech,15 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a lower
7. Eli Watkins, NYT: US Threatened Nations over Breastfeeding Resolution, CNN (July
9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/08/politics/world-health-assembly-breastfeeding/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8Q9R-A97C].
8. Id. The spokesperson’s latter concern is probably tied to the Code’s prohibition
against advertising breast-milk substitutes. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. It is also
reminiscent of the primary argument for extending First Amendment protection to commercial
speech: consumers’ interest in receiving information about products and services. See infra
notes 126–27.
9. Julie Smith et al., Health Professional Knowledge of Breastfeeding: Are the Health
Risks of Infant Formula Feeding Accurately Conveyed by the Titles and Abstracts of Journal
Articles?, 25 J. HUM. LACTATION 350, 350 (2009); see also CDC, INFANT FEEDING PRACTICES
STUDY II: RESULTS ch. 9, tbl.9.6 (2008), https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/ifps/data/
ifps2_tables_ch9.pdf [https://perma.cc/96CP-TRSN] (indicating that 15.5 percent of
American mothers disagree that ear infections and respiratory illness are less likely in
breastfed babies, and that 36 percent think infant formula is as good as breast milk).
10. See infra notes 26–28, 46–52, 60–62 and accompanying text.
11. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 10–11.
12. See Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of
Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 563–86 (2013) (surveying recent lower court
decisions on commercial speech issues, including mandatory disclosures about smoking risks,
radio-frequency energy absorbed by cell phone users, and detailed nutritional information
about restaurant menu items); Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972
(2017) (listing examples of compelled commercial disclosures, like “[s]alt-shaker icons on
foods deemed to be high in sodium [and] textual warnings that highlight the potential dangers
of smoking,” and describing such disclosures as “a pervasive, if often unobtrusive, aspect of
daily life”).
13. See infra Parts II.B–C.
14. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–68 (1925) (“[F]reedom
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
15. See infra Part II.A. In First Amendment jurisprudence, “commercial speech is an
expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience, generally
in the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and services, or speech
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standard for compelled commercial disclosures in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,16 where it held that a mandatory disclosure of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . .
services will be available” was permissible because it was “reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”17
Lower courts have frequently disagreed about when a disclosure qualifies for
review under the Zauderer standard and the appropriate test to apply to a
disclosure that is ineligible for Zauderer review.18 While most courts
consider “purely factual and uncontroversial” a prerequisite for Zauderer
review,19 they have defined the phrase differently.20
The Supreme Court may have offered some clarity with its recent decision
in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).21 The
Court treated “uncontroversial” as a threshold requirement that the disclosure
not relate to a controversial subject matter.22 In doing so, the Court diverged
from two interpretations commonly adopted by lower courts: that
“uncontroversial” refers (1) to the factual accuracy of the disclosed
information, or (2) to the implicit ideology underlying the disclosure.23
However, the Court provided no explanation for its position.
proposing a commercial transaction.” 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 499 (2009). The
exact scope of commercial speech is “not very well-explored,” but an item’s packaging, such
as its label, is consistently viewed as commercial speech. Nigel Barrella, First Amendment
Limits on Compulsory Labeling, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 525 (2016).
16. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
17. Id. at 651. Courts have described Zauderer’s standard as “rational-basis review,” a
“reasonable-relationship rule,” or a “rational relationship test.” See Dayna B. Royal, The
Skinny on the Federal Menu-Labeling Law & Why It Should Survive a First Amendment
Challenge, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 140, 184 (2011). This Note adopts the “reasonable
relationship” terminology because the Court’s recent application of the test in National
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), particularly its scrutiny of the state’s
justifications, seems less deferential than traditional rational basis review. 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2376–78 (2018). However, it is worth noting that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion,
critiqued the Court’s “searching” standard of review as “incompatible with Zauderer.” Id. at
2390 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. See infra Part II.B.2. The Supreme Court has provided relatively little guidance about
how to apply Zauderer. Note, supra note 12, at 972–73.
19. See infra Part II.C. However, the Ninth Circuit treats “factual and uncontroversial”
as part of the Zauderer test rather than a limit on its scope. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City
& County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage Ass’n II), Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL
387114, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc) (“The Zauderer test, as applied in NIFLA,
contains three inquiries: whether the notice is (1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and
(3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome. A compelled disclosure accompanying a related
product or service must meet all three criteria to be constitutional. Neither NIFLA nor any
other Supreme Court precedent requires that we apply these criteria in any particular order.”)
(citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372). However, Judge Sandra
Ikuta challenged this approach as inconsistent with the NIFLA Court’s analytical framework,
which treats “factual and uncontroversial” as a threshold question for determining whether
Zauderer applies. Am. Beverage Ass’n II, 2019 WL 387114, at *7–9 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from
most of the reasoning, concurring in the result) (citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates,
138 S. Ct. at 2372); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
22. Id. at 2366.
23. See infra Part II.C.
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This Note illustrates the public health implications of the various
interpretations of “uncontroversial” in the context of the WHO’s
recommendation that member countries require infant formula labels to
disclose the benefits of breastfeeding. Part I provides an introduction to the
relevant public health background, first describing the current status of
mandatory disclosures for infant formula, then exploring the debate about the
“Breast Is Best” policy.24 Part II presents a brief overview of the related First
Amendment doctrines of compelled speech and commercial speech,
followed by a discussion of the Zauderer and NIFLA opinions. It then
explores various interpretations of “uncontroversial.” Part III considers how
a mandatory disclosure about the risks of infant formula might fare under
each interpretation. Finally, Part IV argues that factual accuracy, not
“uncontroversial subject matter,” appropriately limits Zauderer’s scope.
I. PUBLIC HEALTH EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BREASTFEEDING
Most medical organizations and public health experts consider
breastfeeding to be the ideal form of infant nutrition and regard increased
rates of exclusive breastfeeding as a key public health goal.25 Indeed, the
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and WHO recommend exclusive breastfeeding for an
infant’s first six months, followed by continued breastfeeding for at least one
year as solid foods are gradually introduced.26 The AAP stated that “infant
nutrition should be considered a public health issue and not only a lifestyle
choice”27 due to demonstrated health benefits for infants and mothers and
“the health risks of not breastfeeding.”28 Despite this evidence and the
WHO’s repeated exhortations to member states to adopt legal provisions
promoting breastfeeding, sales of breast-milk substitutes continue to grow

24. The “Breast Is Best” adage is frequently used to describe breastfeeding-promotion
efforts. See, e.g., Joan Y. Meek, Opinion, Breast Is Best: Why Breastfeeding Is the Greatest
Public Health Policy of All Time, NEWSWEEK (July 19, 2018, 10:11 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/breast-best-why-breastfeeding-greatest-public-health-policy-alltime-opinion-1032330 [https://perma.cc/HZM5-94U4]; Elissa Strauss, The “Breast Is Best”
Policy Backlash, CNN (July 11, 2018, 1:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/health/
breastfeeding-parenting-strauss/index.html [https://perma.cc/4Z8P-8Y4N].
25. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Trump Stance on Breast-Feeding and Formula Criticized by
Medical Experts, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/well/
breastfeeding-trump-resolution.html [https://perma.cc/3NAZ-TG4B] (“[T]he consensus of
most mainstream medical organizations is that ‘breast is best’ when it comes to infant nutrition
and health.”); see also Arthur I. Eidelman et al., Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk,
129 PEDIATRICS e827, e827 (2012) (“Breastfeeding and human milk are the normative
standards for infant feeding and nutrition.”).
26. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 3; Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28;
Breastfeeding: Frequently Asked Questions, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/faq/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/464G-QSLL] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
27. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827. The CDC has also declared that
“Breastfeeding is an Investment in Health, Not Just a Lifestyle Decision.” Breastfeeding: Why
It Matters, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/about-breastfeeding/why-it-matters.html
[https://perma.cc/SSJ2-F8C2] (last updated Feb. 5, 2019).
28. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28; see also infra notes 46–62.
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rapidly worldwide, with an expected increase in the global infant formula
market from $56 billion in 2017 to $70.6 billion by 2019.29
Part I.A discusses the WHO’s recommended provisions for promoting
breastfeeding, focusing on mandatory disclosures, and describes current
mandatory disclosures for formula in the United States. Part I.B explores the
debate about the “Breast Is Best” policy. It begins with a brief review of the
reported health benefits of breastfeeding and then examines criticism of both
the policy and underlying science.
A. Government-Compelled Disclosures About Formula and Breastfeeding
The WHO has long viewed the promotion of breastfeeding as an essential
public health goal and considers “[t]he protection, promotion and support of
breastfeeding . . . among the most effective interventions to improve child
survival.”30 The Code, adopted by the WHA in 1981, requires that
information about “artificial feeding,” including information from health
workers and on product labels, “explain the benefits of breastfeeding and the
costs and dangers associated with the unnecessary or improper use of infant
formula and other breast-milk substitutes.”31 Additionally, the Code
prohibits advertising or otherwise promoting breast-milk substitutes to the
general public.32
Since 1981, the WHA has adopted several resolutions that clarify, extend,
or update the Code provisions,33 most recently WHA Resolution 71.9.34 The
Assembly continues to urge member states to implement the Code,35 and the
WHO has emphasized that “[t]he Code remains as relevant and important as
when it was adopted in 1981, if not more so.”36 As of April 2018, 136 of

29. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 7; Global Infant Formula Market—Insights, COHERENT
MKT. INSIGHTS (Dec. 2018), https://www.coherentmarketinsights.com/market-insight/
infant-formula-market-2330 [https://perma.cc/FBS2-5FQX].
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 10–11. Articles 4.2 and 7.1 of the Code address health workers’ responsibility
to provide “clear information on . . . the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding . . . [and] the
health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breast-milk
substitutes.” World Health Org. [WHO], International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk
Substitutes, at 10, 12 (1981), http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N26U-ZACC]. Article 9.2 requires formula containers or labels to have “a
clear, conspicuous, and easily readable” message that includes the words “Important Notice”
(or similar language), “a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding,” and a statement that
formula “should be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use and
the proper method of use.” Id. at 13.
32. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 10–11; International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk
Substitutes, supra note 31, at 10–12.
33. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 5–6. For example, WHA Resolution 54.2 increased the
recommended period of exclusive breastfeeding from four to six months, to six months. Id. at
6.
34. Infant and Young Child Feeding, supra note 4.
35. See, e.g., id. at 2.
36. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 7.
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194 countries had implemented legal measures “covering all, many or few
provisions of the Code.”37 The United States has implemented none.38
However, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) imposes certain
disclosure requirements on infant formula labels pursuant to its authority
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).39 Specifically, labels must
include designated nutrient information,40 directions for use,41 a warning
statement about improper preparation and use,42 and “[a] statement
indicating that parents should consult their physicians about the use of infant
formulas.”43 Moreover, the AAP states that pediatricians should serve as
breastfeeding advocates and “[c]ommunicat[e] with families that
breastfeeding is a medical priority.”44 However, studies suggest that many
pediatricians are not strong advocates and do not tell parents about the risks
associated with formula feeding.45
B. The “Breast Is Best” Debate
Efforts to promote breastfeeding are based on numerous studies that report
significant health benefits for both breastfed infants and their mothers.46 For
example, breastfed infants have lower risks of ear infections,47 respiratory
37. World Health Org. [WHO], Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes: National
Implementation of the International Code, Status Report 2018, at 10 (2018),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272649/9789241565592-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RXA2-2NME].
38. Id. at 42.
39. 21 C.F.R. § 107 (2017). The authority comes from four sections of the FDCA:
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343, 350a, and 371. Id.
40. Id. § 107.10.
41. Id. § 107.20(a)–(d).
42. Id. § 107.20(e).
43. Id. § 107.20(f).
44. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e836.
45. Sharon Radzyminski & Lynn Clark Callister, Mother’s Beliefs, Attitudes, and
Decision Making Related to Infant Feeding Choices, 25 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 18, 26 (2016).
46. See, e.g., Cesar G. Victora et al., Breastfeeding in the 21st Century: Epidemiology,
Mechanisms, and Lifelong Effect, 387 LANCET 475, 479–85 (2016) (listing the benefits of
breastfeeding for infants and mothers). Evidence of these benefits comes mostly from studies
conducted in low- or middle-income countries (LMICs). Id. at 476–78, 488. Data on
breastfeeding in LMICs tend to be higher quality than data from high-income countries, which
rarely use the standard WHO indicators of breastfeeding practices (e.g., for exclusive
breastfeeding under six months and continued breastfeeding at one year). Id. Another
important difference between LMICs and high-income countries is that in LMICs, unlike highincome countries, breastfeeding is more prevalent among the poor. BERNARDO L. HORTA &
CESAR G. VICTORA, SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF BREASTFEEDING: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON THE
BENEFITS OF BREASTFEEDING ON DIARRHOEA AND PNEUMONIA MORTALITY 33 (2013),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/95585/9789241506120_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39XJ-HTR3]. Consequently, in LMICs, confounding by socioeconomic
status is likely to underestimate the benefits of breastfeeding. Id. For a more extensive
discussion of breastfeeding research in a legal journal, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Arianne
Renan Barzilay, The Health/Care Divide: Breastfeeding in the New Millennium, 35 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 264, 272–79 (2018).
47. See generally Gayan Bowatte et al., Breastfeeding and Childhood Acute Otitis Media:
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, ACTA PÆDIATRICA, Dec. 2015, at 85. This study
found that exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months is associated with the lowest risk of
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infections,48 gastrointestinal infections,49 sudden infant death syndrome
(SIDS),50 and necrotizing enterocolitis (a serious gastrointestinal disease in
premature infants).51 Evidence also suggests that breastfeeding may
decrease the risk of a child becoming overweight or obese and developing
type 2 diabetes later in life,52 and it may be associated with higher
intelligence.53 Furthermore, breastfeeding mothers experience both shortand long-term health benefits, including decreased postpartum blood loss,54
as well as lower risks of cardiovascular disease55 and breast cancer.56
Breastfeeding may also reduce the mother’s risk of type 2 diabetes,57 ovarian
cancer,58 and rheumatoid arthritis.59 Moreover, public health officials stress
ear infections, but longer duration of breastfeeding and any breastfeeding were also associated
with reduced risk. Id. at 88–92.
48. HORTA & VICTORA, supra note 46, at 33 (suggesting that breastfeeding may reduce
the risk and severity of respiratory infections). But see Michael S. Kramer et al., Promotion
of Breastfeeding Intervention Trial (PROBIT): A Randomized Trial in the Republic of
Belarus, 285 JAMA 413, 417 (2001) (finding that breastfeeding did not have a statistically
significant effect on respiratory tract infections).
49. HORTA & VICTORA, supra note 46, at 15–16. This review found that “more intense
breastfeeding” practices, particularly exclusive breastfeeding, were associated with a lower
risk of gastrointestinal infection. Id. at 16–20. While most studies included in the review were
observational, the authors did identify three randomized trials that suggested breastfeeding
reduced the risk of diarrhea. Id. at 1–2, 15.
50. STANLEY IP ET AL., BREASTFEEDING AND MATERNAL AND INFANT HEALTH OUTCOMES
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 93–95 (2007). While studies generally focus on breastfeeding’s
protective effect against death in LMICs, a meta-analysis of high-quality primary studies
shows that breastfeeding also reduces the risk of SIDS in developed countries. Id. This
analysis included only studies adjusting for potential confounding variables, such as maternal
age, socioeconomic status, and exposure to smoking. Id. at 95–97.
51. Id. at 98–102. This finding is supported by four randomized controlled trials. Id. at
98–100.
52. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 480–83. Most studies were from high-income
countries. Id.
53. Id. at 483–84. Most studies were from high-income countries. Id. These studies
adjusted for several confounding variables, although the authors acknowledged the possibility
of residual confounding by socioeconomic status. Id.; see also Eidelman et al., supra note 25,
at e830 (“Consistent differences in neurodevelopmental outcome between breastfed and
commercial infant formula-fed infants have been reported, but the outcomes are confounded
by differences in parental education, intelligence, home environment, and socioeconomic
status.”).
54. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e831.
55. See Eleanor Bimla Schwarz et al., Duration of Lactation and Risk Factors for
Maternal Cardiovascular Disease, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 974, 979–81 (2009)
(finding that mothers who breastfed for more than twelve months total were 10 percent less
likely to develop cardiovascular disease than mothers who never breastfed). This study was
based on clinical trials and an observational study of postmenopausal women; the authors
noted the possibility that participants misreported their breastfeeding duration. Id. at 980.
56. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e832; Victora et al., supra note 46, at 483–85.
57. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 484–85. Breastfeeding is not associated with a
decreased risk of type 2 diabetes in mothers diagnosed with gestational diabetes. Eidelman et
al., supra note 25, at e831.
58. Victora et al., supra note 46, at 483–85.
59. Elizabeth W. Karlson et al., Do Breast-Feeding and Other Reproductive Factors
Influence Future Risk of Rheumatoid Arthritis?: Results from the Nurses’ Health Study, 50
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 3458, 3461–65 (2004). The authors acknowledged that
“unmeasured confounding” could account for the reduced risk. Id. at 3465.
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the contamination risks associated with both bottles and infant formula, the
latter of which “is not a sterile product and . . . may carry germs that can
cause fatal illnesses.”60 Furthermore, caregivers may overdilute formula,
particularly when they are unable to buy enough.61 Overdilution leads to
malnutrition, which makes the infant extremely susceptible to starvation,
disease, and death.62
However, as exemplified by the debate surrounding WHA Resolution
71.9, support for “Breast Is Best” is not universal. Opponents criticize the
underlying science, pointing to methodological flaws of the studies reporting
breastfeeding benefits.63 In particular, most of the research consists of
observational studies rather than experimental or randomized controlled
trials,64 which means that the studies establish only that breastfeeding is
associated with the identified benefits, not that it caused them.65
Additionally, the data does not clearly indicate whether breast milk, the act
of breastfeeding, or a combination of the two, may provide the identified
benefits.66 Critics also emphasize risks associated with breastfeeding,

60. Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 4.
61. Benjamin Mason Meier & Miriam Labbok, From the Bottle to the Grave: Realizing
a Human Right to Breastfeeding Through Global Heath Policy, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1073, 1083 (2010). This problem is particularly pervasive in developing countries, where “20
percent of mothers who used formula were found to have diluted the formula over 40 percent
more than recommended.” Id. at 1084.
62. Id.
63. See Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 278 (“Breastfeeding studies are
largely based on observations, associations, and correlations without being able to attribute
causality. Indeed, one study that identified a correlation between breastfeeding and certain
health benefits simultaneously warns against attributing causality, arguing that more cautious
studies are needed to control ‘confounding factors.’”); Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Breastfeeding
Story Is More Complicated Than You Think, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/23/what-youve-read-aboutbreastfeeding-may-not-be-true [https://perma.cc/XYG6-P6ZA] (“[F]laws in some of the
studies tracking long-term health effects raise questions about the magnitude—and at times
the existence—of some of those advantages.”). The AAP’s Policy Statement on breastfeeding,
while affirming its recommendation of exclusive breastfeeding, acknowledges these flaws:
“Major methodologic issues have been raised as to the quality of some of these studies,
especially as to the size of the study populations, quality of the data set, inadequate adjustment
for confounders, absence of distinguishing between ‘any’ or ‘exclusive’ breastfeeding, and
lack of a defined causal relationship.” Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e828.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION
TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING 33 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52682/
pdf/Bookshelf_NBK52682.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL2P-FJYG]. Prospective randomized
controlled trials in this context are typically ethically undesirable. See generally Colin Binns
et al., Ethical Challenges in Infant Feeding Research, 9 NUTRIENTS 59 (2017) (describing
ethical problems with randomly assigning infants to breastfeeding and nonbreastfeeding
groups). The mere existence of these ethical concerns illustrates the strong consensus in the
medical community about the benefits of breastfeeding.
65. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 64, at 33; see also supra note
63.
66. Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding
and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 48–49 (2009); see
also Bowatte et al., supra note 47, at 92 (suggesting that differences in the manner of feeding,
i.e., from the breast or from a bottle, may contribute to the reduced risk of ear infections in
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particularly the danger of insufficient lactation and starvation—risks that are
rarely communicated to new parents.67
Opponents of “Breast Is Best” also criticize the policy itself. For example,
some contend that the WHA Resolution ignores “mothers’ right to informed
choice and bodily autonomy.”68 Others point out that some women may be
physically unable to breastfeed69 and also note that American employers do
not routinely accommodate breastfeeding.70 Thus, women should not be
shamed for not providing their children with the “best” nutrition.71
Despite these criticisms of the science and the policy, “most mainstream
medical organizations” agree that “breast is best,”72 and the AAP, CDC, and
WHO have all declared that promoting breastfeeding is a key public health
goal.73 While acknowledging the methodological weaknesses of the studies,
the AAP still concluded that “the documented short- and long-term medical
and neurodevelopmental advantages of breastfeeding” justify the
organization’s recommendation for exclusive breastfeeding.74 In light of this
evidence, why have Congress, the FDA, and state legislatures and agencies
failed to adopt the Code’s provisions? This Note suggests that recent
developments in First Amendment doctrine pose a significant hurdle to
compelled disclosures about the benefits of breastfeeding.
II. ZAUDERER: THE CONTROVERSIAL COLLISION OF COMPELLED SPEECH
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”75 Several key theories underlie First
Amendment protection.76 One core principle is that a speaker—whether a
breastfed infants). Thus, it is unclear whether infants who are bottle-fed breast milk would
experience the same reported benefits as infants fed directly from the breast.
67. See Fentiman, supra note 66, at 50; Strauss, supra note 24.
68. Kavin Senapathy, The ‘Breast Is Best’ Breastfeeding Campaign Is Misguided, DAILY
BEAST (July 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-breast-is-bestbreastfeeding-campaign-is-misguided [https://perma.cc/99T7-NCWR]; see also supra note 8
and accompanying text.
69. Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 283–84. But see Eidelman et al., supra
note 25, at e827 (“Medical contraindications to breastfeeding are rare.”).
70. Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 279–82.
71. See Watkins, supra note 7 (quoting an HHS spokesperson who stated that “[m]any
women are not able to breastfeed for a variety of reasons, these women should not be
stigmatized”); see also Laufer-Ukeles & Barzilay, supra note 46, at 284 (“These medical
guidelines have ballooned into a pervasive cultural pressure to breastfeed, which even includes
shaming for those who fail to comply with the newly established norms.”).
72. Rabin, supra note 25.
73. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
74. Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e827–28.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. See Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1344–45
(2015) (identifying “autonomy, self-government, and the search for truth” as the “principal”
First Amendment theories); see also Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA.
L. REV. 867, 871 (2015) (“First Amendment jurisprudence contains distinct doctrinal regimes
that apply to distinct forms of speech . . . because the Constitution values different kinds of
speech for different reasons.”).
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private individual or commercial entity77—“has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.”78 This autonomy is implicated both when the
government restricts speech and when it compels someone to speak.79 First
Amendment protection is also grounded in listeners’ interests—specifically,
“the public’s interest in receiving information,” which is essential to listener
autonomy and effective self-government.80 However, the Court has weighed
these interests differently depending on context, “impos[ing] tight constraints
upon government efforts to restrict, e.g., ‘core’ political speech” but “looser
constraints” upon government regulation of commercial speech.81
However, growing protection for commercial speech has put the First
Amendment “on a collision course” with public health.82 Mandatory
disclosures and warnings are widely used as a regulatory tool in public
health,83 but the constitutionality of these requirements is unsettled.84 Lower
courts have struggled to determine what types of disclosures fall within
Zauderer’s scope, how to apply the test to those disclosures, and what level
of scrutiny to apply to disclosures outside Zauderer’s scope.85
Part II.A provides an overview of commercial speech doctrine and
compelled speech doctrine, respectively, since Zauderer is generally
77. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (“A company has
the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues . . . .”).
78. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995). The Court described this autonomy as “the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment.” Id.
79. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) (“[I]n some
instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on
speech.”); see also infra Part II.A.1.
80. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion);
see also infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1. Some scholars have also argued that First Amendment
doctrine should protect a listener’s interest in not being subjected to government-mandated
speech—a “right against compelled listening.” Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment
Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 980 (2009) (“[W]hen the
government makes a captive audience listen against its will to a government message, it runs
roughshod over individuals’ right to control their own development and decision-making
processes.”); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 531 (2014). In the
context of private speech, restrictions to protect listeners from “intrusive or unwelcome
messages” are impermissible, with limited exceptions. Goodman, supra, at 530.
81. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Richard J. Bonnie, The Impending Collision Between First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech and the Public Health: The Case of Tobacco Control, 29 J.L. & POL.
599, 600 (2014); see also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135
(stating that while “federal and state administrative regimes have moved towards lightertouch, often information-based, forms of governance” like mandated disclosures, these
regulatory tools “appear more speech-regulating than earlier conduct regulations, thereby
rendering them more susceptible to First Amendment challenge”).
83. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2007) (“Mandatory disclosure has become a sort of
‘regulation-lite’ extolled even by those who would ordinarily oppose regulation.”); supra note
12 and accompanying text.
84. Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 54–55 (2016).
85. See id. at 65–85 (describing various open questions about Zauderer).
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regarded as an exception to these doctrines or a synthesis of them.86 Part II.B
discusses Zauderer itself, then examines the Court’s treatment of Zauderer
in NIFLA. Part II.C explores one specific area of disagreement: what it
means for a disclosure to be “uncontroversial.”
A. The Doctrinal Foundations: Commercial Speech
and Compelled Speech
The compelled and commercial speech doctrines address speech in
disparate contexts and have accordingly been grounded in different First
Amendment interests. Compelled speech doctrine arose out of government
attempts to compel individuals to convey political or ideological messages,
efforts that the Court has viewed primarily as violations of the speaker’s
autonomy interests—their “freedom of mind.”87 In contrast, commercial
speech doctrine originated in cases where the government banned advertising
to protect consumers from making bad choices and emphasizes the listener’s
interest in receiving factual information.88 Before exploring how listeners’
and speakers’ interests collide in compelled commercial speech doctrine, this
Note provides an overview of the two foundational doctrines.
1. Compelled Speech Doctrine: Protecting Speakers’ Autonomy
First Amendment protection against government-compelled speech
originates from cases about “core political speech and religious objectors.”89
Compelled speech doctrine focuses on speaker interests in autonomy and
“freedom of mind,” but it also implicates listener interests, such as the right
to receive genuine expression that has not been distorted by government
compulsion.90 This right is essential for effective self-government.91
Accordingly, strict scrutiny applies when the government attempts to compel
individuals or corporations to express or convey political or ideological
messages.92
86. See, e.g., Barrella, supra note 15, at 526 (describing Zauderer as a “synthesis” of the
commercial speech and compelled speech doctrines); Note, supra note 12, at 972 (stating that
Zauderer is an exception to the “well-settled” intermediate scrutiny standard for regulations
of commercial speech). But see infra note 155 (explaining that some consider Zauderer an
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard).
87. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“The right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual
freedom of mind.’” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943))); see also infra Part II.A.1.
88. See infra Part II.A.2.
89. Barrella, supra note 15, at 523.
90. Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum,
19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 209–10 (2011).
91. Id. at 210–11. The public must be able to freely discuss political, religious, and
economic issues to elect the best representatives and truly “consent” to being governed. See
id. at 210 n.29 (“If listeners receive forced expression, individual judgments and the common
judgment will be infected with the government’s coercion.”).
92. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (stating that “[f]or corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak
includes within it the choice of what not to say,” and that the government may not “compel
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The Court first addressed the problem of government-compelled speech in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,93 where it invalidated a
state requirement that students in public schools salute and pledge allegiance
to the American flag.94 Jehovah’s Witnesses children who refused to comply
due to religious objections were expelled, and their parents were prosecuted
or threatened with prosecution.95 The Court suggested that compulsion to
declare a belief might be justified “only on even more immediate and urgent
grounds” than restrictions of speech and concluded that the state’s asserted
interest in fostering national unity was insufficient to sustain the mandatory
pledge.96
The First Amendment also provides protection against compulsion to
convey another’s message even where the speaker is not required to express
faith or agreement with the message. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,97 the Court held unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring a
newspaper to publish the replies of a political candidate it had criticized.98
Proponents of the statute argued that newspaper monopolies frequently
presented only one side of a political or ideological issue, thereby threatening
the First Amendment interest in a “marketplace of ideas” and an informed
public.99 However, the Court contended that government-enforced access
may actually reduce the public’s ability to receive information about political
issues because editors might decide “to avoid controversy” rather than
criticizing a candidate and being forced to devote its limited column space to
a reply.100 Such a result would undermine a fundamental purpose of the First
Amendment, which is “to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs,” including discussion of candidates.101 The Court ruled that
compelling newspapers to publish material is an unconstitutional contentbased regulation of the press and noted that the statute “operates as a
command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to
publish specified matter.”102
The Court’s decision in Tornillo established “[t]he constitutional
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence,” a principle that

corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree” unless the
regulation is “a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest”); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (noting that freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, and worship “are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect”).
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. Id. at 642.
95. Id. at 629–30.
96. Id. at 633, 641.
97. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
98. Id. at 256–57.
99. Id. at 251–53.
100. Id. at 256–57. In this sense, a speech compulsion may also function as a speech
restriction.
101. Id. at 257 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
102. Id. at 256.
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applies beyond cases involving the press.103 In Wooley v. Maynard,104 the
Court relied on Barnette and Tornillo for the proposition that the First
Amendment protects “both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”105 New Hampshire law required noncommercial cars
to bear a license plate with the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” and made it
a misdemeanor to obscure the motto.106 A Jehovah’s Witness who objected
to the message on moral, religious, and political grounds was fined and jailed
for covering up the motto on his and his wife’s license plates.107 The Court
held that the state could not force an individual to disseminate an ideological
message.108
Strict scrutiny also applies to compelled disclosure of facts when the
regulation burdens “fully protected expression” rather than “[p]urely
commercial speech.”109 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina,110 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a North Carolina law
requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the
percentage of the charitable donation that the fundraiser would retain.111 The
Court stated that speech does not “retain[] its commercial character when it
is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”112 The
factual disclosure required by the state, though possibly relevant to potential
donors, constituted a substantial burden on that protected speech.113 The
Court invalidated the disclosure requirement and pointed to more narrowly
tailored options for addressing donors’ misperceptions about how much of
103. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988). Despite this
“equivalence,” the Court has regarded compelled speech as less burdensome than speech
restrictions; for example, it deemed mandatory disclosure of campaign contributions “the least
restrictive means” to reduce “campaign ignorance and corruption.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 68 (1976). Similarly, where the government seeks to prevent or correct consumer
deception, compelled commercial disclosures are preferable to advertising restrictions. See
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
104. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
105. Id. at 714.
106. Id. at 707.
107. Id. at 707–08.
108. Id. at 713. The Court applied strict scrutiny and concluded that “where the State’s
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot
outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message.” Id. at 717. Uncertainty remains about what qualifies as “ideological speech,”
especially “in the context of abortion informed consent laws.” Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed
Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 41 (2016).
109. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–98, 796 n.9 (1988); see also
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(“[T]his general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker
would rather avoid . . . .”).
110. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
111. Id. at 786, 796–98.
112. Id. at 796. Charitable solicitations are fully protected. Id. at 795–96.
113. Id. at 797–98. The Court reasoned that the disclosure could impede professional
fundraisers’ efforts to raise money for charities; for example, a potential donor who dislikes
the disclosed percentage would probably “close[] the door or hang[] up the phone” without
allowing the fundraiser to explain the amount. Id. at 799–800.

1666

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

their donation goes to charity.114 However, the Court noted that “[p]urely
commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure
requirements.”115 While First Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally
permitted greater regulation of commercial speech than ideological
speech,116 recent cases reflect growing protection for commercial speakers.
2. Commercial Speech Doctrine: Shifting Focus
from Listeners to Speakers
Commercial speech jurisprudence is “unsettled and hotly disputed
terrain.”117 The Supreme Court denied First Amendment protection to
commercial speech until 1974 and subsequently indicated that, even though
such speech was entitled to protection, it occupied a “subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values.”118 However, over the past two
decades, the Court has provided substantial protection to commercial speech,
at least in the context of speech restrictions.119 In Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.,120 the Court concluded that “heightened scrutiny” applies to contentbased burdens on speech, even those imposed on commercial speech.121
While the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech
was initially based on consumers’ “interest in the free flow of commercial
information,”122 recent decisions have been more attentive to commercial
speakers’ autonomy interests.123 Critics of this trend warn that because
almost all human action occurs through speech, the First Amendment could
become a nearly unlimited tool for commercial deregulation.124
114. Id. at 800–01.
115. Id. at 796 n.9.
116. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
117. Rostron, supra note 12, at 553. One key disagreement is whether commercial speech
merits less protection than political and ideological speech. Several justices have questioned
the differential treatment of commercial speech. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 518 n.21.
Justice Thomas has argued that the Court should adopt strict scrutiny for regulations of
commercial speech, stating that he “do[es] not see a philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that commercial speech is of lower value than noncommercial speech.” See
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522–23 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Goodman, supra note 80, at 529 n.92 (describing Justice Thomas as “the leading
advocate” for treating commercial and noncommercial speech equally).
118. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
119. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict
Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1182
(2013) (noting that, since 1995, the Court has repeatedly invalidated commercial speech
restrictions).
120. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
121. Id. at 565–66.
122. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763–64
(1976); see also Shanor, supra note 82, at 143 (“The commercial speech doctrine was forged
as a tool of consumer protection to secure the value of commercial speech to society, not to
ensure the autonomy interests of commercial speakers.”).
123. See Berman, supra note 84, at 76.
124. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Speech is everywhere—a part of every human
activity . . . . For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches
speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding
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The Supreme Court first recognized First Amendment protection for
commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
The Court’s principal
Consumer Council (Virginia Pharmacy).125
justification for extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech
was individual consumers’ and society’s “interest in the free flow of
commercial information.”126 The Court rejected a “highly paternalistic” ban
on advertising prescription drug prices, arguing that “people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,” which is
better achieved by “open[ing] the channels of communication” than by
“clos[ing] them.”127 However, commercial speech needs less protecting
because of certain “commonsense differences” between commercial speech
and other kinds of speech, such as the lower probability that commercial
speech will be chilled by regulation.128 For example, the state may restrict
“deceptive or misleading” commercial speech,129 or it may require a
particular format or additional disclosures to prevent deception.130
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,131
the Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment protects commercial speech

citizens’ choices.”); IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 588–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court’s content-based analysis of commercial speech restrictions “threatens significant
judicial interference with widely accepted regulatory activity”); Shanor, supra note 82, at 133
(“Because nearly all human action operates through communication or expression, the First
Amendment possesses near total deregulatory potential.”).
125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court described commercial speech as “speech which does
‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Advertising constitutes commercial
speech even if it “links a product to a current public debate.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983) (finding that a drug company’s pamphlets promoting
contraceptives were properly classified as commercial speech “notwithstanding the fact that
they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family
planning”).
126. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64. In this case, the free flow of
information was essential for individual consumers—especially “the poor, the sick, and
particularly the aged”—to compare drug prices; access to this information “could mean the
alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.” Id. More generally, “the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable” in a free market system, as the market
functions properly only if citizens make “intelligent and well-informed” economic policy
decisions. Id. at 765.
127. Id. at 770.
128. Id. at 771 n.24. The Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence over the following
decades echoed this premise: “Our jurisprudence has emphasized that ‘commercial speech
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 n.6
(“[C]ommercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression
that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.’” (quoting
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977))).
129. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–71.
130. Id. at 771 n.24.
131. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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because of the information it provides to consumers.132 The Court then
articulated a four-step analysis for restrictions on commercial speech, which
focuses on whether a regulation of protected commercial speech133 “directly
advances” a “substantial” government interest and is “not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.”134 The Central Hudson analysis has
traditionally been understood as establishing intermediate scrutiny.135 The
government must demonstrate a “reasonable” fit between the legislature’s
ends and its means, which must be narrowly tailored but not necessarily the
least restrictive option.136 However, since 1995, the Court has repeatedly
struck down government efforts to restrict nonmisleading speech about legal
commercial activities, adopting a “muscular” version of Central Hudson’s
requirement that the regulation not be unnecessarily extensive.137
This trend continued in IMS Health, where the Court emphasized that
“heightened scrutiny” applies to content-based burdens on speech and stated
that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”138 The Vermont statute that was
challenged prohibited the sale, disclosure, and use of information about
individual doctors’ prescribing practices.139 The prohibition expressly
applied to the use of this information for marketing prescription drugs and
132. Id. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising.”).
133. The first prong of the Central Hudson test asks whether the First Amendment protects
the commercial expression at issue. Id. at 566. To receive protection, commercial speech
“must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Id.
134. Id.
135. Post, supra note 76, at 881.
136. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (describing the
“fit” as “not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to
the interest served’” (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982))). The Court has noted
that “if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’
between ends and means is reasonable.” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993).
137. Stern & Stern, supra note 119, at 1182; see, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 561–66 (2001) (finding that advertising regulations did not “reasonabl[y] fit” the
state’s goal of reducing tobacco use by minors, where state banned smokeless tobacco or cigar
advertising within a 1000-foot radius of a school or playground, and also required that any
point-of-sale advertising at stores within this radius be placed higher than five feet from the
floor). Professor Robert Post criticizes Central Hudson’s “not more extensive than is
necessary” requirement as “so vague that it has sometimes functioned chiefly to provide a
hunting license for judges who dislike market regulations.” Post, supra note 76, at 885.
138. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011). Justice Breyer criticized
the majority’s application of a “standard yet stricter than Central Hudson,” pointing out that
content-based regulations have never “before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory
activity affects commercial speech” because “[r]egulatory programs necessarily draw
distinctions on the basis of content.” Id. at 588–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Claudia E.
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 188 (2018) (“[T]he doctrine
of content neutrality . . . is incompatible with professional speech . . . . [T]he regulation of
professional speech, in order to achieve its aim, cannot be content-neutral; indeed, the value
of professional advice depends on its content.”). Justice Breyer warned that “[i]f the Court
means to create constitutional barriers to regulatory rules that might affect the content of a
commercial message, it . . . threatens significant judicial interference with widely accepted
regulatory activity.” IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 558–59.
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provided exceptions for healthcare research and educational communications
to patients.140 Legislative findings accompanying the statute revealed that
its express purpose and effect were to “diminish the effectiveness of
marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs,”141 with the ultimate
policy goals of promoting public health and decreasing health-care costs.142
Because the statute disfavored particular content, the Court concluded that
heightened judicial scrutiny was required.143 The Court acknowledged that
Vermont’s policy goals may be proper but rejected the State’s paternalistic
means—restricting access to truthful information out of the fear that people
would make bad decisions.144 The Court emphasized that a “consumer’s
concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than
his concern for urgent political dialogue,” particularly in the public health
context, “where information can save lives.”145 Furthermore, the ongoing
debate over the merits of doctor-specific marketing and brand-name drugs
must be resolved through “free and uninhibited speech.”146 The government
may not advance its own position by burdening its opponents’ speech.147 In
striking down the Vermont statute, the IMS Health Court thus invoked both
the speaker’s autonomy interest and consumers’ informational interest.
In restrictions on commercial speech, the autonomy interests of
commercial speakers are aligned with listeners’ interests in receiving
information—both are undermined when the government impedes the flow
of nonmisleading commercial speech. But when the government seeks to
compel commercial speech, those interests may clash.148 In Zauderer, which
drew heavily on the rationale of Virginia Pharmacy, listeners’ interests
prevailed.149
B. The Legal Standard for Compelled Commercial Speech
Zauderer established a deferential standard of review for compelled
commercial disclosures, holding that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”150 Thus, compulsions
140. Id. at 558–60.
141. Id. at 565. The state found that such marketing caused “hasty and excessive reliance”
on brand-name drugs rather than safer, less expensive generic alternatives, and “increase[d]
the cost of health care and health insurance.” Id. at 561.
142. Id. at 576.
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 577.
145. Id. at 566 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
146. Id. at 578–79.
147. Id.
148. However, “increasing the volume of information may not always serve the
constitutional interest in the ‘free flow’ of information,” because consumers may experience
“information overload.” Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
“Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 437 (2016). Furthermore, because “[a] product label
or advertisement can only hold so much information,” a disclosure requirement may force a
seller to omit “another set of information more valued by consumers.” Id. at 445–46.
149. See infra Part II.B.1.
150. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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of commercial speech are treated more deferentially than restrictions, unlike
in the context of noncommercial speech, where compulsions and restrictions
are constitutionally equivalent.151
However, controversy regarding Zauderer’s scope and application persists
more than thirty years later, as lower courts disagree over the significance of
various elements of the opinion.152 The question of how much weight to give
to the speaker’s interests and the listeners’ interests—which are not aligned
as they are in speech restrictions—may further complicate the analysis. Part
II.B.1 presents the language and holding of Zauderer, and Part II.B.2
examines NIFLA, the Court’s most recent case discussing Zauderer.
1. Zauderer’s Special Treatment of a “Factual and Uncontroversial”
Disclosure
In Zauderer, the Court upheld an Ohio State Bar requirement that any
attorney advertisements “that mention[] contingent-fee rates must . . . inform
clients that they would be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if
their claims were unsuccessful.”153 An attorney who was disciplined for
violating this requirement challenged the rule as a First Amendment
violation.154 In upholding the rule, the Court created a new test for compelled
commercial disclosures distinct from Central Hudson’s standard for
commercial speech restrictions.155
The Court reasoned that because First Amendment protection for
commercial speech is largely based on consumers’ interest in receiving
information,156 the appellant had a “minimal” First Amendment interest in
not providing specific factual information.157 Thus, the Court held that “an
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.”158 The Court noted that its commercial speech
precedents had emphasized that disclosures were much less burdensome than
bans of advertising, and it had therefore recommended disclosures as a means
to address potential consumer deception.159 The Court acknowledged,
151. Goodman, supra note 80, at 519–20; see also supra notes 102–05 and accompanying
text.
152. See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
153. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633.
154. Id. at 634.
155. See id. at 651; Royal, supra note 90, at 219 (“The Zauderer Court held Central Hudson
inapplicable and adopted a more lenient test, a ‘reasonable relationship’ test.”). But see Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[O]ne could
think of Zauderer largely as ‘an application of Central Hudson, where several of Central
Hudson’s elements have already been established’” (quoting Supplemental Brief for
Appellants at 9, Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18 (No. 13-5281))); Adler, supra note 148, at 435
(characterizing Zauderer as “a relatively straightforward application of the Central Hudson
framework” rather than “an alternative test for compelled commercial speech”).
156. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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however, that “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements”
might be unconstitutional if they “chill[ed] protected commercial speech.”160
The Court also distinguished the disclosure at issue from Barnette,
Tornillo, and Wooley, arguing that “the interests at stake in this case are not
of the same order” as the interests in those cases: “Ohio has not attempted to
‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.’”161 Instead, Ohio specified what was “orthodox in commercial
advertising” by requiring advertisers to include “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” about the terms of service.162
The language in Zauderer primarily describes why the disclosure at issue
in the case was permissible and does not announce a clear test.163
Consequently, lower courts have interpreted terms differently and disagreed
over whether certain language in the opinion establishes a prerequisite for
Zauderer deference or is simply descriptive.164 Areas of disagreement
include the meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial,”165 whether
Zauderer is limited to regulations addressing deception,166 whether Zauderer
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
162. Id.
163. Barrella, supra note 15, at 527.
164. Id.; see also Note, supra note 12, at 979 (“Zauderer’s treatment in various circuits
most closely resembles a fractured, frequently contradictory mosaic.”). A discussion of these
various interpretations is beyond the scope of this Note, which will focus on the meaning of
“uncontroversial.” For a more comprehensive review, see generally Barella, supra note 15;
and Berman, supra note 84.
165. See infra Part II.C. This Note does not fully explore the meaning of “purely factual,”
which is taken up directly in cases about graphic cigarette warnings. See infra note 198.
166. See Post, supra note 76, at 882. Professor Post argues that the Court “poorly crafted”
the sentence “we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.” Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). He argues that this sentence misled
some courts into thinking that Zauderer’s scope is limited to disclosures for preventing
deception and that Zauderer is properly interpreted as “holding that commercial disclosure
requirements for ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ are constitutional ‘as long
as’ they ‘are reasonably related’ to an appropriate state interest.” Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage
Ass’n I), 871 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Zauderer’s “we hold . . .” sentence “is
best read as a specific application of Zauderer’s more general rule that a purely factual and
uncontroversial disclosure that is not unduly burdensome will withstand First Amendment
scrutiny so long as it is reasonably related to a substantial government interest”), aff’d on other
grounds on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en
banc). The circuit courts that have addressed this issue have “unanimously concluded” that
Zauderer applies “even in circumstances where the disclosure does not protect against
deceptive speech.” CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley (CTIA v. Berkeley II), 854
F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).
However, disputes remain over which state interests are sufficient. Berman, supra note 84, at
73–77. The Second Circuit has concluded that “consumer curiosity alone” is insufficient to
justify a mandatory disclosure. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir.
1996). Instead, the information must “bear[] on a reasonable concern for human health or
safety or some other sufficiently substantial governmental concern.” Id. Then-Judge Brett
Kavanaugh agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that “providing consumers with
information” they are interested in is not itself a sufficient government interest. Am. Meat Inst.
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applies outside of the context of advertising and product labeling,167 whether
identifying a disclosure as government speech is relevant,168 and the proper
standard of review if Zauderer does not apply.169 The Supreme Court’s
decision in NIFLA may have resolved some of this confusion, but it raises
questions of its own.
2. NIFLA: The Latest Word on Zauderer
In NIFLA, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a California law
requiring clinics that “primarily serve pregnant women”170 to provide certain
government-drafted notices.171 Specifically, the state required licensed
clinics to disseminate a notice on-site that informed women that California
provides “immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception),
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women” and instructed women to
contact the county social services office to determine whether they are
eligible for these services.172 The state also required unlicensed clinics to
provide a notice “on site and in all advertising materials,” which stated that
the “facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the
provision of services.”173
The Court stated that Zauderer did not apply to the licensed-clinic notice,
because the notice “is not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial
information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.’”174
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 31–32 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the judgment).
167. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II), 800 F.3d 518, 521–24
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that Zauderer does not apply to compelled disclosures “that are
unconnected to advertising or product labeling at the point of sale”), with id. at 535–36
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s limit on Zauderer’s scope as without
precedent and inconsistent with Zauderer’s rationale).
168. See Berman, supra note 84, at 81–84 (“One . . . open question is whether
unambiguously identifying a disclosure as ‘government speech’ leads to an even more relaxed
standard of review than Zauderer . . . .”).
169. Barella, supra note 15, at 539; Berman, supra note 84, at 77–81. The D.C. Circuit
and Second Circuit apply Central Hudson, the Sixth Circuit applies strict scrutiny, and some
courts avoid the question of which standard applies because the regulation fails under either.
See Barella, supra note 15, at 539.
170. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018). The
California State Legislature sought to regulate crisis pregnancy centers, which are typically
“pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited range of free
pregnancy options, counseling, and other services.” Id. (quoting CASEY WATTERS ET AL.,
PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS: ENSURING ACCESS AND ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4
(2015)).
171. Id. at 2368.
172. Id. at 2369–70.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2372 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). For further support that “Zauderer does not apply outside of these
circumstances,” the Court cited Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), a case about parade organizers’ right to decide which
groups to include as marchers. Id.
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According to the Court, the notice did not relate to the services that the clinics
provided175 but instead “require[d] these clinics to disclose information about
state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”176 The Court concluded that the notice would fail
under strict scrutiny and even intermediate scrutiny because it was “wildly
underinclusive” and a less restrictive alternative existed.177 The Court did
include a disclaimer, stating that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion in the dissent,
we do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about
commercial products.”178
The Court did not decide whether Zauderer applied to the unlicensedclinic notice, because it concluded that the notice failed even Zauderer’s
deferential standard.179 It emphasized that “[e]ven under Zauderer, a
disclosure requirement cannot be ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome,’”
which would risk “chilling” protected speech.180 To satisfy this standard, the
Court reasoned, compelled disclosures must “remedy a harm that is
‘potentially real not purely hypothetical’”181 and “extend ‘no broader than
The Court concluded that California’s
reasonably necessary.’”182
justification for the notice, “ensuring that ‘pregnant women in California
know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals,’”183
was “purely hypothetical.”184 Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s
analysis as “incompatible” with Zauderer: rather than evaluating whether
the notice is “reasonably related to the State’s interest,” the majority
“applie[d] a searching standard of review based on our precedents that deal
with speech restrictions, not disclosures.”185 The Court also determined that
175. Id. Justice Breyer disagreed, arguing that information about free, state-provided
resources for the same services is “related” to the clinic’s services and stating that “for those
interested in family planning and abortion services, information about such alternatives is
relevant information to patients offered prenatal care, just as Casey considered information
about adoption to be relevant to the abortion decision.” Id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2372 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that California “requires primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions,” which “compels individuals to
contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or
religious precepts, or all of these”). The Court also concluded that the licensed-clinic notice
was “not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”
Id. at 2373–74 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 2375. Thus, the Court did not resolve the debate over which level of scrutiny is
appropriate when Zauderer does not apply. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
178. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 2377–78.
180. Id. at 2377 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)).
181. Id. (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy,
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
182. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
183. Id. (quoting Assemb. 775 § 1(e), 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015)).
184. Id. (quoting Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146).
185. Id. at 2390 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The NIFLA opinion was authored by Justice
Thomas, who previously expressed “skeptic[ism] of the premise on which Zauderer rests,”
which is that, unlike in the political speech context, the First Amendment interests implicated
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the government-drafted notice “unduly burden[ed]” protected speech
because it was overbroad and “require[d] covered facilities to post
California’s precise notice, no matter what the facilities say on site or in their
advertisements.”186
C. What Makes a Commercial Disclosure
“Factual and Uncontroversial”?
In finding that Zauderer did not apply to the licensed-clinic notice in
NIFLA because the state required disclosure of information about abortion,
the Court addressed one open issue: the significance of Zauderer’s reference
to the “factual and uncontroversial information” mandated by the Ohio State
Bar.187 The NIFLA Court took the position that “uncontroversial” means a
disclosure related to a controversial topic is ineligible for Zauderer review—
an interpretation that no lower court had adopted, at least outside of the
context of abortion.188 A review of the case law and scholarship before
NIFLA reveals two primary arguments for what type of disclosure is eligible
for review under Zauderer: (1) the disclosure must contain accurate factual
information;189 or (2) the disclosure must contain accurate factual
information that does not implicitly convey ideology, an inquiry that looks
to whether there is controversy over the normative content or salience of the
facts.190 This section explores the various approaches to “factual and
uncontroversial,” focusing on the doctrinal and policy justifications for each
position, and then suggests possible rationales for the NIFLA Court’s
position.
1. Accurate Factual Information
Several courts and scholars have interpreted “factual and uncontroversial”
to limit Zauderer’s scope to disclosures that contain accurate factual
information.191 In arriving at this conclusion, they draw on both the text of
by compelled commercial speech are “substantially weaker” than those implicated by
restrictions on speech. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 652 n.14). NIFLA may vindicate claims that the Court has been “gradually inching
towards Justice Thomas’s position.” See Goodman, supra note 80, at 529 n.92.
186. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377–78. But see id. at 2390
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has long held that a law is not unreasonable merely
because it is overinclusive.”).
187. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
188. Barrella, supra note 15, at 534, 541 (stating that if “controversial” is defined as
“dealing with controversial subject matter,” “it would be a first,” and that “even a ‘highly
controversial subject matter’ definition seems unlikely in light of all the cases that have come
before”). The only other case that has adopted this interpretation is Evergreen Ass’n v. City
of New York, which involved a similar disclosure requirement for crisis pregnancy centers.
740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014); see infra notes 259–60.
189. See infra Part II.C.1.
190. See infra Part II.C.2.
191. See, e.g., CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United
States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012); Berman, supra note 84, at 65 (“[T]he ‘factual

2019]

COMPELLED COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURES

1675

Zauderer and the Court’s justifications for distinguishing the compelled
speech in Zauderer from Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that a mandatory disclosure, to be eligible
for Zauderer’s deferential review, must include accurate factual information
but need not be uncontroversial.192 In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc.
v. United States,193 the court emphasized that the term “noncontroversial”
appears only once in Zauderer, and “merely describes” the disclosure at issue
in the case rather than imposing an additional requirement.194 As further
support for its position, the court noted that elsewhere in the opinion,
Zauderer refers only to disclosures of “factual information” and “accurate
information.”195 The court also argued that the 2010 Supreme Court case of
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States196 clearly indicated that a
disclosure need not be uncontroversial for Zauderer to apply because the
Court never used the phrase “purely factual and noncontroversial”: “The
Court instead uses the language required factual information and only an
accurate statement when describing the characteristics of a disclosure that is
scrutinized for a rational basis.”197 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a
disclosure is entitled to Zauderer review if it conveys factual information and
not a personal or political opinion, regardless of whether the disclosure
“incites controversy.”198
and uncontroversial’ limitation is best read as a check to ensure that any mandated statement
is factually accurate (or factually uncontroversial).”); Royal, supra note 90, at 235 & n.6
(arguing that Zauderer should apply when a regulation mandates “disclosure of
uncontroverted facts about a specific product or service sold,” and stating that “[t]he relevant
question is whether evidence supports the existence of the facts—and thus whether the facts
themselves are controverted—not whether the desire to share the information is
controverted”). Justice Breyer seems to adopt that position in NIFLA, stating that “[a]bortion
is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the availability of state resources
is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable truth.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 559 n.8.
193. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
194. Id. at 599 n.8 (“This language appears in Zauderer once and the context does not
suggest that the Court is describing the characteristics that a disclosure must possess for a
court to apply Zauderer’s rational-basis rule.”).
195. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14
(1985)). Specifically, the Zauderer Court stated that “appellant’s constitutionally protected
interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal” and
that “[t]he right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his
services is not such a fundamental right” that “strict scrutiny must be applied.” Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651 & n.14.
196. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
197. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 559 n.8 (citing Milavetz, 559 U.S. at
249–50). Indeed, neither “uncontroversial” nor “controversial” appear anywhere in the
Milavetz opinion. See generally Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229.
198. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 569. The court noted that “[f]acts can
disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm
reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.” Id. at 569. The court’s
analysis centered on whether graphic warning requirements for cigarette labels were “purely
factual,” a question which is beyond the scope of this Note. For contrasting views, compare
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012), with id. at
1229–32 (Rogers, J., dissenting), and Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 558–61.
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The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Zauderer applies to mandatory
disclosures of accurate factual information.199 The court stated that
“‘uncontroversial’ in this context refers to the factual accuracy of the
compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience.”200 The
court reasoned that this interpretation was consistent with the facts of
Zauderer: the state’s requirement that an attorney disclose a client’s potential
liability for costs “may have caused controversy,” by damaging the
reputation of lawyers who offered contingency-fee arrangements or
discouraging potential customers, but such controversy “did not affect the
constitutional analysis.”201 Instead, the analysis depends on whether the
disclosure provides accurate factual information.202 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Zauderer only requires a disclosure to be “purely factual.”203
Advocates for the “accurate factual information” interpretation disagree
over the requisite level of consensus about a fact’s accuracy. They have
suggested at least three different standards for finding that information is not
factually accurate under this approach to Zauderer: (1) where there is any
disagreement, (2) where there is “reasonable” disagreement by scientists or
199. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).
200. Id. at 1117. The Northern District of California previously adopted the same
interpretation of Zauderer’s text, stating that “‘[u]ncontroversial’ should generally be equated
with the term ‘accurate’; in contrast, ‘factual’ goes to the difference between a ‘fact’ and an
‘opinion.’” CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley (CTIA v. Berkeley I), 158 F. Supp.
3d 897, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.). Judge Sri Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit also argued for this
interpretation in his dissenting opinion in National Ass’n of Manufacturers II. 800 F.3d 518,
538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). Like the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco,
Judge Srinivasan emphasized the absence of “uncontroversial” in Milavetz. Id. at 538.
201. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d at 1118.
202. Id. The court noted that a compelled disclosure may not be “purely factual” if it is
“literally true but nonetheless misleading and, in that sense, untrue.” Id. at 1119. The Ninth
Circuit later struck down a San Francisco ordinance requiring advertisements for sugarsweetened beverages to include the warning that “[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s)
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.” Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d 884, 888,
895 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL
387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc). The court found that the accuracy of the warning
was “in reasonable dispute” because of evidence that those health conditions may not develop
if sugar-sweetened beverages are consumed in moderation and the individual does not
consume more calories than she uses. Id. at 895. Furthermore, the court said that the warning
was “misleading” because it was required only in advertisements for sugar-sweetened
beverages, not for other products with as much or more added sugars, which implied that
sugar-sweetened beverages are “uniquely or inherently unhealthy”—an implication with
insufficient evidentiary support. Id. at 895–96. The court concluded that Zauderer did not
apply to a mandatory disclosure that forced advertisers “to convey San Francisco’s disputed
policy views.” Id. at 896. After rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit again concluded that the
lower court abused its discretion in not granting a preliminary injunction against the ordinance.
Am. Beverage Ass’n II, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 31,
2019) (en banc). However, the court’s reasoning was based solely on its determination that
the disclosure requirement was unduly burdensome; it did not reach the question of whether
the warning was factually accurate and uncontroversial. Id. at *5. As noted above, the Ninth
Circuit regards “factual and uncontroversial” as part of the Zauderer test rather than a limit on
its scope. See id. at *4; supra note 19.
203. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d at 1118.
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the public, or (3) where a claim is unverified or unsupported by the weight
of scientific research. One judge has implied that any dispute over accuracy
places a disclosure outside of Zauderer’s scope.204 However, scholars have
not seriously considered this standard, as it would mean that safety warnings
long considered legal would be ineligible for Zauderer review.205
Another position is that “reasonable” disagreement about the accuracy of
a fact renders it “controverted.”206 Consequently, Zauderer would not apply
if “even a substantial minority of scientists or the public” challenge the
accuracy of the statement.207 However, this test seems inherently
problematic from a policy standpoint, at least to the extent that it looks to
public disagreement with the statement. It would subject factual disclosures
to heightened scrutiny whenever there is widespread misinformation—a
situation where factual disclosures are arguably even more necessary.
In contrast, Professor Micah Berman suggests that “factually accurate”
could be interpreted similarly to “medically accurate,” which was defined in
the Affordable Care Act as “verified or supported by the weight of research
conducted in compliance with accepted scientific methods” and “published
in peer-reviewed journals, where applicable” or recognized by “leading
professional organizations and agencies with relevant expertise . . . as
accurate.”208 Under this interpretation, a greater number of disclosures may
be “factually accurate” and therefore eligible for deferential review. The
Northern District of California has argued that disagreement about the
scientific basis for a disclosure does not make it “controversial.”209 To hold
otherwise, the court said, would mean that “Zauderer would never apply,
especially where there are health and safety risks” because “science is almost
always debatable at some level.”210
204. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d at 537–38 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“To qualify
as ‘purely factual and uncontroversial,’ in short, the disclosed information must in fact be
‘factual,’ and it must also be ‘uncontroversially’ so, in the sense that there could be no
‘disagree[ment] with the truth of the facts required to be disclosed.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc))).
205. But see Barrella, supra note 15, at 540 (stating that a literal interpretation of Judge
Srinivasan’s statement would lead to the incorrect conclusion that the government could not
require warnings about smoking risks, inter alia, because some people dispute the accuracy of
even well-established facts).
206. Royal, supra note 90, at 238; see also Barrella, supra note 15, at 541 (“The question,
then, may be not only whether disagreement with the facts is possible, but reasonable
disagreement.”). Under this standard, a fact is controverted if empirical support for the
information is sufficiently mixed that it could “cause a reasonable consumer to choose
between two competing views”; “[o]ne fringe person arguing that the moon is made of green
cheese will not do.” Royal, supra note 90, at 238. This appears to be the standard adopted by
the Ninth Circuit in American Beverage Ass’n I: the court stated that the accuracy of the
disclosure at issue was “in reasonable dispute.” 871 F.3d at 895.
207. Royal, supra note 90, at 238.
208. Berman, supra note 84, at 66 n.57 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 713 (2012)).
209. CTIA v. Berkeley I, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1105
(9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).
210. Id.; see also Barrella, supra note 15, at 540 (“[A]nyone can (and many routinely do)
disagree with the truth of factual matters, even ones that should be uncontroversial in light of
all we know.”); Berman, supra note 84, at 66 n.57 (“[M]any well-established facts are
contested by a small number of dissenters.”).
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The focus on accuracy is arguably central to Zauderer’s rationale for
extending greater deference to compelled commercial disclosures. Because
commercial speech is protected primarily for its value to consumers, a
commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing
any particular factual information . . . is minimal.”211 However, where “the
truth of information is seriously controverted,” the information no longer
seems factual.212 Instead, the government essentially “forc[es] a speaker to
endorse one or another opinion about the truth of the underlying
information.”213 And as Zauderer emphasized, a state’s attempt to
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion” implicates
substantial First Amendment interests.214 Thus, where the state compels a
commercial speaker to convey another’s opinion, strict scrutiny—and not
Zauderer’s “reasonable relationship” standard—will apply.215
The interpretation of “purely factual and uncontroversial” to require only
factual accuracy has been critiqued on textual, legal, and policy grounds. The
interpretation arguably renders the phrase redundant: as the D.C. Circuit
pointed out, “Is there such a thing as a ‘purely factual’ proposition that is not
‘accurate’?”216 Furthermore, a disclosure may advance a controversial
ideology even if it conveys accurate factual information.217 Compelled
ideological speech implicates both the speaker’s autonomy interest and the
listener’s interest “in a public discourse free of state compulsion.”218
Because of the important interests at stake, if the government attempts to

211. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
212. Post, supra note 76, at 910.
213. See id.
214. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Professor Sarah Haan suggests that the Zauderer Court, in establishing
a lower standard for “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures, “may have really
intended to preserve strict scrutiny for disclosures that cause the speaker to affirm an
ideological message.” Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 36), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3209366 [https://perma.cc/ELS8-TB9Q]. However, she argues that “‘purely
factual and uncontroversial’ does not mean ‘non-ideological.’” Id.
215. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the government may not “compel corporate speakers to propound
political messages with which they disagree” unless the regulation is “a narrowly tailored
means of serving a compelling state interest”).
216. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But see id. at 537
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “purely factual and uncontroversial,” as a phrase from
a judicial opinion, “should be ‘read in context,’ taking into account the whole of the court’s
analysis” rather than “be[ing] parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute”
(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979))); Barrella, supra note 15, at 533
n.101 (“Descriptive redundancies are common in spoken and written language, non-legal as
well as legal . . . .”). According to Judge Srinivasan, Zauderer’s purpose of “providing
consumers with useful information about products and services”—which is “the reason for
protecting commercial speech in the first place”—is “honored” when a commercial speaker is
required to disclose “purely factual” and “accurate” information. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800
F.3d at 537 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
217. Goodman, supra note 80, at 550; see also infra Part II.C.2.
218. Goodman, supra note 80, at 550.
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force an individual or company to convey another’s ideology, it must prove
narrow tailoring, not simply a reasonable relationship.219
The interpretation may also be problematic from a policy standpoint,
especially if a relatively low level of scientific consensus is required for a
disclosure to be eligible for Zauderer review. Overuse of warnings,
particularly those that are unsubstantiated or relate to “extremely remote”
risks, may cause people to doubt the credibility of warnings and disregard
them.220
Furthermore, excessive disclosure requirements also raise
constitutional problems, since they may not serve listeners’ interests.221
Thus, factual accuracy alone may not sufficiently limit Zauderer’s scope.
2. Accurate Factual Information That Does Not
Implicitly Convey Ideology
An alternate interpretation is that “uncontroversial” imposes an
independent legal standard that goes beyond “factual accuracy”222 and,
therefore, that Zauderer does not apply to a disclosure if there is controversy
over the “normative content or relevance” of the facts.223 Such disclosures
arguably force a commercial speaker to implicitly convey a controversial
ideology.
The D.C. Circuit and Seventh Circuit, while not defining “controversial”
precisely,224 have found that Zauderer does not apply to “opinion-based”
disclosures.225 For example, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a state law
requiring a sticker on any video game that met the statutory definition of
“sexually explicit” because “[t]he sticker ultimately communicates a
subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s content is
sexually explicit.”226 The court distinguished the labeling mandate from a
requirement that manufacturers label products containing mercury because
the definition of “sexually explicit” was “far more opinion-based.”227 In

219. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51; supra Part II.A.1.
220. CTIA v. Berkeley II, 854 F.3d 1105, 1126 (9th Cir. 2017) (Friedland, J., dissenting in
part), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).
221. See supra note 148.
222. Under this interpretation, a disclosure would also be excluded from Zauderer review
if it does not contain accurate factual information. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 554.
223. Id. at 552. The information’s relevance may be distinct from the question of whether
the disclosure provides information about the product or “about the terms under which . . .
services will be available.” See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. For example, a disclosure that a
particular milk product was derived from cows treated with a synthetic growth hormone is
information about the product, but may not be salient without evidence of health risks. See
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]onsumer curiosity
alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual
statement.”).
224. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Entm’t Software Ass’n v.
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
225. Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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other words, the video game disclosure conveys ideology because “the facts
disclosed [were] evaluative facts228 embodying a contested norm.”229
The D.C. Circuit has stated that “uncontroversial” imposes an additional
legal test beyond whether the disclosure is “purely factual” and looks to
whether the disclosure “communicates a message that is controversial for
some reason other than [a] dispute about simple factual accuracy.”230 The
court suggested that “[p]erhaps the distinction is between fact and
opinion.”231 In support of its position, the court pointed to the Supreme
Court’s warning in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission232 that “Zauderer does not leave the state ‘free to require
corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages
themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s
views.’”233 For example, the D.C. Circuit found that the description of a
product as “conflict free” or “not conflict free,” while statutorily defined in
relation to factual information about the origin of materials, was a “metaphor
that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war”—and thus was not
“factual and non-ideological.”234 The court has also noted “the possibility
that some required factual disclosures could be so one-sided or incomplete
that they would not qualify as ‘factual and uncontroversial.’”235
Furthermore, a disclosure may communicate a message that is
controversial due to a disagreement about the need for that disclosure,236
although this interpretation has not been adopted in any published opinions.
It is, however, reflected in an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion.237 San
228. Evaluative facts are those that “cannot exist without judgment,” unlike “natural or
empirical facts that exist with little to no judgment involved.” Goodman, supra note 80, at
546; see also William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in RightsEnforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 894–97 (2013) (stating
that “[e]mpirical facts can be defined as facts whose truth or falsity can be tested by experience
or experiment in the world,” whereas “[e]valuative facts are statements reflecting conclusions
drawn from empirical facts” and “entail a mixture of empirical observation and value
judgment”). For example, killing is a “natural” fact because “[i]t exists in nature as the taking
of a life,” while murder is an “evaluative” fact because it “entail[s] judgments as to justified
homicide or self-defense.” Goodman, supra note 80, at 546. Difficulty verifying an empirical
fact—like “the degree to which human activity is causing climate change”—does not make it
an evaluative fact. Araiza, supra, at 894.
229. Goodman, supra note 80, at 551.
230. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)
(quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)).
231. Id. The court noted, however, that “it is far from clear that all opinions are
controversial.” Id.
232. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
233. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15 n.12).
234. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. I), 748 F.3d 359, 363, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A manufacturer “may disagree with
that assessment of its moral responsibility.” Id. at 371.
235. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27.
236. See Goodman, supra note 80, at 553 (“The work that ‘noncontroversial’ does in the
advancement of consumer-autonomy interests is to impose a germaneness requirement on the
state.”).
237. See CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (CTIA v. San
Francisco II), 494 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Francisco required cell phone retailers to display a poster stating “[c]ell
phones emit radiofrequency energy,” “[s]tudies continue to assess potential
health effects of mobile phone use,” and the city’s recommendations for
reducing exposure to radiofrequency energy.238 The Ninth Circuit found
that, given the scientific uncertainty about the health risks of cell phone use,
the city’s recommendations could “be interpreted by consumers as
expressing San Francisco’s opinion that using cell phones is dangerous.”239
The plaintiffs in Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell240 advocated for
a similar interpretation.241 Food manufacturers and retailers objected to a
Vermont law requiring them to identify whether food was produced through
genetic engineering.242 Although this was factual, the plaintiffs argued that
the disclosure was “controversial” because, in the midst of a political and
public debate about the safety of genetically engineered foods, the mandatory
label implicitly conveyed the message that such foods were unsafe.243
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and stated that “the
compelled information must, itself, be ‘controversial.’”244
A factually accurate disclosure may thus imply a value judgment or
suggest that a consumer should change her behavior due to potential health
risks that have not been conclusively determined. Through these implicit
messages, the government advances its own position. And while the
government may take a side, it may not force a commercial speaker to carry
its message in these “matters of opinion” without subjecting its actions to
strict scrutiny, as Zauderer itself noted.245 Professor Ellen Goodman
suggests that an interpretation of “uncontroversial” that looks to the salience
of the disclosed facts would properly focus the analysis on “the cornerstone
of commercial speech law: consumer autonomy.”246 If the state forces
commercial speakers to convey messages irrelevant to consumer choice, it
essentially uses its power to regulate commerce “to build an ideological

238. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (CTIA v. San
Francisco I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1057–58 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th
Cir. 2012). San Francisco acknowledged that research had not definitely established risks
associated with cell phone use, but justified the disclosure requirement through the
“Precautionary Principle, which provides that the government should not wait for scientific
proof of a health or safety risk before taking steps to inform the public of the potential for
harm.” Id.
239. CTIA v. San Francisco II, 494 F. App’x at 753. Indeed, the WHO classifies radiofrequency radiation as a “possible” carcinogen, a category which actually means that there is
“no known statistical correlation” to cancer. CTIA v. San Francisco I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1060–
61.
240. 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015).
241. Id. at 621, 628.
242. Id. at 594.
243. Id. at 621, 628.
244. Id. at 628.
245. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
246. Goodman, supra note 80, at 517.
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platform.”247 Such state action improperly infringes upon listeners’
interests.248
The proposition that a factual disclosure may be controversial due to
disagreement over the salience of the facts assigns independent meanings to
“purely factual” and “uncontroversial” and, thus, avoids rendering the phrase
redundant. In contrast, if the meaning of uncontroversial is “not opinionbased,” as the D.C. Circuit and Seventh Circuit implied, “then the Zauderer
test is reduced to ‘factual and not opinion-based’”—which does appear
redundant.249
Interpreting “uncontroversial” as “indisputably salient” has been criticized
on policy grounds. Professor Berman argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
on San Francisco’s recommendations for reducing exposure to radiofrequency energy “is troubling from a public health perspective” because it
“would force legislatures to wait for the chimera of ‘scientific certainty’
before taking any action to disclose proven or potential risks, essentially
rendering them powerless.”250 Legislatures may wish to “take proactive
steps to avoid or mitigate potential harms, even if those harms are still
speculative,” because by the time the risk is verified, it may be too late.251
They may decide that the potential health risks justify the possible economic
harm caused by a mandatory disclosure.252
Furthermore, the proposition that the government must objectively convey
factual information and not advance its own position cannot be applied too
broadly—at least, not without subjecting longstanding disclosure
requirements to heightened scrutiny. The government “often seeks
simultaneously to inform and to influence consumer purchases by mandating
product disclosures,”253 like warning labels on cigarette packages.254
Professor Goodman suggests one limiting principle: “It is not the existence
of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather the insistence on a
controversial norm.”255

247. Id. at 568–69.
248. Id. Conversely, government interference may be warranted if the compelled messages
are salient to consumers.
249. See Barrella, supra note 15, at 533 (characterizing the D.C. Circuit’s definition of
uncontroversial as “not opinion-based,” and arguing that “if . . . ‘factual and accurate’ is a
redundancy, it is hard to see how ‘factual and not opinion’ is any less so”). Perhaps
“evaluative facts” are not “facts” at all, but opinions—which could mean that they are
excluded from Zauderer review because they are not “purely factual,” not because they are
controversial.
250. Berman, supra note 84, at 72–73. Professor Berman suggests that “warnings should
be invalidated only if the government lacks a factual basis for the required statements.” Id. at
73.
251. Id. at 76; see also supra note 238.
252. Berman, supra note 84, at 76.
253. Goodman, supra note 80, at 515.
254. Id. at 540–41.
255. Id. at 517.
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Additionally, Pacific Gas’s language that a corporate speaker cannot be
compelled to carry a message biased against its own views256 does not
prohibit forcing a commercial speaker to disclose information contrary to his
interests. In Zauderer itself, the advertiser was required to include
information he may not have wanted to disclose, and that might have caused
him to lose potential customers—but the disclosure was nonetheless deemed
“uncontroversial.”257
3. Factual Information That Is Not Related
to a Controversial Subject Matter
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have both interpreted
Zauderer’s “uncontroversial” language to mean that a disclosure related to a
controversial subject matter is not entitled to deferential review under
Zauderer, though neither court explained its rationale.258
Like the Supreme Court in NIFLA, the Second Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of a law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to disclose
information about abortion, contraception, and prenatal care.259 In a
footnote, the court said that even assuming the city law regulated commercial
speech, Zauderer did not apply because the law did not “require disclosure
of ‘uncontroversial’ information” but rather required centers “to mention
controversial services [opposed by] some pregnancy services centers.”260
The NIFLA Court distinguished California’s licensed-clinic disclosure
from the mandatory disclosure at issue in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,261 which it characterized as a regulation
of professional conduct that incidentally burdened speech, rather than a
compelled commercial disclosure.262 Thus, under the NIFLA Court’s
approach, the controversial subject matter of the disclosure at issue in Casey
was irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. Justice Breyer, in his dissenting
opinion, criticized this distinction as inconsistent with “the rule of law,”
which “embodies evenhandedness.”263
From a textual standpoint, the NIFLA Court’s definition of “controversial”
avoids the redundancy highlighted by critics of the factually accurate and
not-opinion-based interpretations.264 However, it seems unlikely that the
256. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
257. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
258. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018);
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014).
259. See Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 249–50. New York City Local Law 17 required that
pregnancy services centers disclose, among other things, whether they “provide or provide
referrals for abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care.” Id. at 249.
260. Id. at 245 n.6.
261. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
262. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74.
263. Id. at 2385 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no convincing reason to
distinguish between information about adoption and information about abortion in this
context.”).
264. See supra notes 216, 249 and accompanying text.
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Zauderer Court conceived of “uncontroversial” as referring to the subject
matter of the disclosure because the topic of the disclosure in Zauderer,
contingent-fee arrangements,265 was itself controversial.266 Furthermore,
even if the Court was referring to the subject matter, it is unclear whether the
Court intended to establish uncontroversial subject matter as a prerequisite
for the reasonable relationship test.267
The possibility of interpreting “uncontroversial” as “uncontroversial
subject matter” was widely rejected before NIFLA.268 Some criticism of this
definition is driven by a concern that it overly impedes the government’s
ability to use disclosures to advance public health goals. Professor Robert
Post argues that “mandated factual disclosures [should not] become
constitutionally disfavored because they occur in circumstances of
acrimonious political controversy,” since factual disclosures may be
especially crucial “in the context of socially contested issues like tobacco or
obesity.”269 While the NIFLA Court stated that it did “not question the
legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible,”270 it
failed to explain what distinguished the licensed-clinic disclosure, motivated
in part by the state’s concerns about women’s health, from those permissible
warnings.271 Justice Breyer argued that, “[i]n the absence of a reasoned
explanation” for this distinction, the Court’s “test invites courts around the
Nation to apply an unpredictable First Amendment to ordinary social and
economic regulation, striking down disclosure laws that judges may
disfavor.”272
The NIFLA standard could arguably be “highly controversial subject
matter,” which would make more disclosures eligible for Zauderer review
than merely “controversial subject matter.” However, it is unclear exactly
what that standard would mean, since courts have only used subject matter
as a limit on Zauderer’s scope in the context of abortion-related
disclosures.273 Perhaps “highly controversial subjects” are those that
implicate an individual’s “most deeply held” ethical or religious beliefs.274

265. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
266. See Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
813, 813–16 (1989) (describing traditional arguments against contingent fees).
267. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. II, 800 F.3d 518, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J.,
dissenting) (“While it might be said that the Conflict Minerals Rule’s disclosure requirement
touches on a ‘controversial’ topic, that alone cannot render the disclosure ‘controversial’ in
the sense meant by Zauderer.”); Barrella, supra note 15, at 534 (describing such a definition
as “impracticable”).
269. Post, supra note 76, at 910; see also Haan, supra note 214 (manuscript at 37)
(“[C]ontroversial information—information that sheds light on a subject people care about—
has a high value to individuals and society.”).
270. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018).
271. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 174–76, 259–60 and accompanying text.
274. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that the licensed-clinic notice “compels individuals to contradict
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Or perhaps the simplest explanation is that abortion-related disclosures raise
unique legal concerns275 and veer too close to the fact-ideology line for the
Court to be comfortable with compelled disclosure.
III. WHAT “UNCONTROVERSIAL” MEANS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
Given the prevalence of mandatory disclosures as a regulatory tool,276 how
courts interpret “uncontroversial”—and thus which disclosures are eligible
for Zauderer’s deferential “reasonable relationship” test—has serious
implications for public health. This Part illustrates these implications by
applying each interpretation to a hypothetical disclosure for an infant formula
label:
Compared to breastfed infants, formula-fed infants have a higher risk of ear
infections, respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, and sudden
infant death syndrome.277

This disclosure reflects the breastfeeding research discussed in Part I.B and
addresses a perceived information gap—the belief of many mothers that
formula-fed infants are not more likely to get sick than breastfed infants.278
It is also designed to comply with Zauderer’s prerequisite that the disclosed
information relate to the product or service offered by the commercial
speaker,279 in this case infant formula.
Part III.A applies the “accurate factual information” test, Part III.B applies
the “accurate factual information that does not implicitly convey ideology”
test, and Part III.C applies the “controversial subject matter” test.
A. Outcome Under the “Accurate Factual Information” Test
The hypothetical disclosure contains factual information, but its accuracy
is contested.280 How the disclosure would fare depends on what level of
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious
precepts, or all of these”).
275. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 80, at 531 (describing “women seeking abortions” as
“a special sort of listener, with much more liberty on the line than those in the typical product
disclosure context”).
276. See supra notes 12, 82–83 and accompanying text.
277. This disclosure was crafted by the Note author. By design, it differs significantly from
a labeling mandate adopted by India in its implementation of the WHO Code. India requires
an infant formula label to include a conspicuous statement that “‘mother’s milk is best for
your baby’ in capital letters.” Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Foods
(Regulation of Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, No. 41 of 1992, INDIA CODE (1992).
India’s disclosure seems more clearly normative—“best” is arguably an evaluative fact, if not
an opinion. Furthermore, what is “best” for a baby depends on the circumstances. For
example, where a mother is unable to breastfeed or pump at work, it is surely better for the
mother to feed her child formula than to lose her job and be unable to pay the rent for their
home.
278. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part I.B. Some of the controversy over the “Breast Is Best” policy is tied
to the risks associated with insufficient lactation. See supra text accompanying note 67.
However, those risks do not bear on the factual accuracy of the disclosed benefits, and a
disclosure requirement does not prevent the formula company from including additional
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controversy over its accuracy excludes a disclosure from Zauderer review:
whether it is unverified or unsupported by the weight of scientific
research,281 whether there is “reasonable” disagreement by scientists or the
public,282 or whether there is any disagreement.283 The disclosure arguably
satisfies a definition like “medically accurate” under the Affordable Care
Act284: it is “supported by the weight of research conducted in compliance
with accepted scientific methods,”285 “published in peer-reviewed
journals,”286 and recognized as accurate “by leading professional
organizations and agencies with relevant expertise,” namely the AAP, CDC,
and WHO.287 However, the disclosure would probably fail under the
“reasonable disagreement” and “any disagreement” standards, since a
controlled trial found no association between breastfeeding and the risk of
respiratory infections288 and over 15 percent of American mothers do not
believe that ear infections and respiratory illness are less likely in breastfed
babies.289
Whether the accuracy of the information is contested may also depend on
whether a court or a consumer reading the label would assume it means that
breastfeeding causes a reduced risk of the specified infections and SIDS.290
As discussed in Part I.B, research on infant nutrition has established an
association between breastfeeding and reduced risks of the specified
conditions.291 However, because of ethical barriers associated with
randomized controlled trials of infant feeding, scientists have been unable to
establish causation.292 Thus, if the court thinks the disclosure suggests
causation, it would likely fail regardless of the level of consensus required.
Furthermore, a court could find that the accuracy of the disclosure is
controversial if it conveys the message that any amount of formula-feeding

factual, nonmisleading information on the label. See supra text accompanying note 67; supra
note 133.
281. See supra text accompanying note 208.
282. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 713 (2012); supra text accompanying note 208.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 713. The meta-analyses conducted by Dr. Victora and his colleagues
show that most studies do indicate an association between breastfeeding and the designated
benefits. See supra notes 46–50.
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 713. The research discussed in Part I.B was published in prestigious
peer-reviewed journals, such as Lancet and the Journal of the American Medical Association.
See supra notes 46–50.
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 713; see also Code FAQ, supra note 3, at 3–5; Eidelman et al., supra
note 25, at e828–29; Breastfeeding: Why It Matters, supra note 27.
288. See supra note 48.
289. See supra note 9.
290. See Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d 884, 895 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d on other grounds
on reh’g, Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073, 2019 WL 387114 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (en banc). The
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of a warning statement on sugar-sweetened beverages looked not only
at the text of the required disclosure, but also at the message that it suggested to consumers,
and evaluated the factual support for each. Id.
291. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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increases the risk of the specified conditions.293 The truth of that message is
unknown because many studies fail to distinguish among categories of
Existing studies indicate that exclusive
breastfeeding practices.294
breastfeeding for the first six months is associated with the lowest risk of ear
infections but also suggest a correlation with longer durations of
breastfeeding.295 Similarly, “more intense breastfeeding” is associated with
a lower risk of gastrointestinal infections.296
B. Outcome Under the “Accurate Factual Information That
Does Not Implicitly Convey Ideology” Test
The hypothetical disclosure would probably be eligible for Zauderer
review under this interpretation of “uncontroversial,” assuming it first passes
the accuracy test.297 The required information does not appear to be an
evaluative fact,298 and it informs a consumer’s decision to buy infant
formula.
The hypothetical disclosure consists of empirical facts whose truth can be
verified299—whether formula-fed infants actually do face higher risks of ear
infections, respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, and sudden
infant death syndrome. While it may be more difficult to ascertain the
relationship between breastfeeding and the specified risks than it is to identify
the presence of mercury in a particular product,300 the practical difficulties
do not transform the statement into an evaluative fact.301 It does not involve
a value judgment.302 However, infant formula manufacturers might argue
that it is a metaphor conveying moral responsibility303—that the disclosure
essentially blames the companies for increased deaths and illnesses even
though scientists have not shown that formula causes them.304 A formula
company, like the plaintiffs in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC,305
293. Cf. Am. Beverage Ass’n I, 871 F.3d at 895. The Ninth Circuit found that the accuracy
of the warning statement was “in reasonable dispute” because it “convey[ed] the message that
sugar-sweetened beverages contribute to [specified] health conditions regardless of the
quantity consumed,” even though evidence suggested that overconsumption was responsible.
Id.
294. See Eidelman et al., supra note 25, at e828 (describing the lack of a distinction
between “any” and “exclusive” breastfeeding as a “[m]ajor methodologic issue[]”); Victora et
al., supra note 46, at 476–78, 488.
295. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 49.
297. See supra note 222.
298. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 228.
300. See supra text accompanying note 227.
301. See supra note 228.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 226–27. The hypothetical disclosure also
contrasts sharply with the infant formula labeling requirement adopted by India, which asserts
the value judgment that breast milk is “best.” See Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and
Infant Foods (Regulation of Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, No. 41 of 1992, INDIA
CODE (1992).
303. See supra text accompanying note 234.
304. See supra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
305. 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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“may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility.”306 Thus, the
disclosure may be ineligible for Zauderer review under this standard.
The hypothetical disclosure, which conveys potential risks associated with
infant formula, is salient to a caregiver’s decision whether to buy the product.
The Ninth Circuit did not consider San Francisco’s recommendations for
reducing exposure to radio-frequency energy to be salient because of
scientific uncertainty about the health effects of cell phone use.307 The
science in that case, however, was far less settled than the science about
breastfeeding; there is no known statistical correlation between radiofrequency radiation and cancer.308 But a court might conclude, given the
debate about causation, that the disclosure impermissibly conveys the
government’s opinion that infant formula is a significant health threat.
C. Outcome Under the “Controversial Subject Matter” Test
It is difficult to determine how the hypothetical disclosure would fare
under the “controversial subject matter” test, since the NIFLA Court offered
no explanation for its position and no guiding standard.309 If any amount of
controversy over the topic suffices to exclude a disclosure from deferential
review under Zauderer, the hypothetical statement would fail. As discussed
in Part I.B, the “Breast Is Best” policy is a controversial topic.310
However, the standard could actually be “highly controversial subject
matter.”311 Whether the hypothetical disclosure would survive under this
standard is uncertain, since courts have only applied it in cases about
abortion-related disclosures.312 Perhaps a “highly controversial” topic is one
that touches on only the “most deeply held” ethical or religious beliefs.313
Infant feeding decisions do not seem to impact fundamental beliefs in the
same way as abortion. But regulations compelling formula manufacturers to
carry pro-breastfeeding labels implicate parents’ fundamental rights to
decide, within reason, what is best for their children,314 which might be
considered “highly controversial.” However, the NIFLA Court did not
address this question. And it is possible that the NIFLA Court’s decision is
306. Id. at 371.
307. See CTIA v. San Francisco II, 494 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012).
308. See CTIA v. San Francisco I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1060–61 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d,
494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
309. The Court merely stated that abortion was “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part I.B. Indeed, even the FDA’s current labeling requirements for infant
formula might fail under this standard. See supra text accompanying notes 39–43.
311. See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
313. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the licensed disclosure forced anti-abortion
individuals to contradict those “deeply held beliefs”).
314. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“[T]he ‘liberty’ specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also supra text accompanying
note 7. This label arguably tips the scales in favor of breastfeeding as parents make their infant
feeding decisions.
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the result of a different analysis of “controversial”—namely, that abortion is
special. In any event, without a guiding standard, it is plausible that a judge
who disapproves of breastfeeding or of state involvement in parenting
decisions will decide that the hypothetical disclosure is not eligible for
Zauderer review.315
IV. FACTUAL ACCURACY APPROPRIATELY LIMITS ZAUDERER
How a hypothetical disclosure would fare under each interpretation is a
decidedly different question than what the appropriate standard is or should
be, but it illustrates the policy implications of each standard. The “accurate
factual information” test both represents the most logical application of
Zauderer and produces the most desirable public policy outcomes. In
addition, because the NIFLA Court’s discussion of the “uncontroversial”
element was conclusory, and because the Court’s ultimate reasoning seems
more focused on other considerations, future courts considering the
appropriate application of the “uncontroversial” test may conclude that
NIFLA did not decide the issue after all and that the relevant considerations
support the application of the “accurate factual information” test.
While each interpretation of “factual and uncontroversial” finds some
justification in the text of the Zauderer opinion and in the foundational
doctrines, First Amendment principles and policy most strongly support
“accurate factual information.” Zauderer was firmly grounded in listeners’
interest in receiving factual information about the speaker’s goods or
services,316 which enables them to make “intelligent and well informed”
economic policy decisions.317 Whether the information touched on a
controversial topic was irrelevant to the Zauderer Court’s constitutional
analysis.318 Indeed, it may be particularly important for consumers to be
well-informed about the health risks of products and services, even if those
health topics are controversial.319 As the IMS Health Court acknowledged,
the consumer’s informational interest “has great relevance in the fields of
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.”320 And as
long as the information is “factual,” the commercial speaker’s First
Amendment interest in not providing that information is minimal.321 If the
disclosed information veers too far over the line from fact into opinion—for
example, if it has inadequate scientific support, or it seems more like a value

315. See supra text accompanying note 272.
316. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
317. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
318. As the Sixth Circuit and Judge Srinivasan argued, the absence of any reference to
“uncontroversial” in Milavetz supports this hypothesis. See supra note 197 and accompanying
text; supra note 200. Furthermore, the disclosure at issue in Zauderer itself related to a
controversial subject matter. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
319. See supra text accompanying note 269.
320. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
321. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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judgment than an empirical fact322—it would not be eligible for deferential
review under Zauderer.323
With regard to the level of factual accuracy required, the definition of
“medically accurate” from the Affordable Care Act may provide an
appropriate limit on Zauderer’s scope.324 It enables the government to
inform consumers about a probable health risk without having to wait for the
“chimera of ‘scientific certainty.’”325 Indeed, in the context of breastfeeding,
ethical constraints on research prevent any certainty about causation.326
Zauderer’s “reasonable relationship” test grants appropriate deference to a
legislature’s determination that the potential health risks outweigh any
economic harm rather than allowing judges, “who are not trained to be
sophisticated reviewers of scientific literature,” to second-guess the factual
basis for the disclosure.327
Concerns about the requisite level of accuracy and salience of disclosures
are well-founded. The government will not achieve its public health aims if
consumers ignore disclosures because the government has warned them,
expressly or implicitly, about too many remote or unsubstantiated risks.328
Furthermore, listeners’ interests may not be served if the inclusion of a
government-mandated disclosure causes the advertiser to omit more valuable
information.329 However, this issue could be addressed through a different
aspect of the Zauderer opinion—if the government lacks a reasonable basis
for concluding that the information is salient to consumers’ decisions about
the product or service, the disclosure requirement would fail Zauderer’s
“reasonable relationship” test as “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”330
Additionally, a disclosure requirement may impose an undue burden if the
message is overly disparaging of the speaker.331 However, courts should
remember that commercial speech is much less likely to be chilled than
political speech.332
The NIFLA Court’s interpretation of Zauderer may reflect skepticism
about differential treatment of commercial speech333 and Zauderer’s premise
that compelled commercial disclosures implicate “weaker” First Amendment
322. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 208, 284–87.
325. Berman, supra note 84, at 72–73.
326. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
327. Berman, supra note 84, at 76.
328. See supra text accompanying note 220.
329. See supra note 148.
330. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). The reason
why the information is important to consumers may also affect a court’s analysis of whether
the disclosure requirement is justified. Information about demonstrated health risks may
justify mandatory disclosure. However, information about whether a dairy product was
derived from hormone-treated cows may be unjustified in the absence of scientific evidence
creating a “reasonable concern.” See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69, 74
(2d Cir. 1996).
331. Goodman, supra note 80, at 538.
332. See supra text accompanying note 128.
333. See supra note 117.
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interests than restrictions.334 However, this approach is extremely
problematic as it undermines the legislature’s ability to protect public health.
Because nearly all human conduct occurs through written, spoken, or
symbolic “speech,” the First Amendment has the potential to be a limitless
deregulatory tool.335 This situation becomes even more perilous when the
Court fails to provide guiding standards—as in NIFLA. The Court claimed
that it did “not question the legality” of longstanding health and safety
warnings, but it did not explain how it distinguished the licensed-clinic
disclosure in NIFLA from those warnings.336 The distinction may simply be
that the licensed-clinic disclosure concerned abortion, the epitome of a
controversial subject. But because the Court did not explain its rationale,
lower courts could use the “uncontroversial subject matter” test to strike
down any disclosure they dislike.337
However, there is arguably an opening for courts to adopt the “accurate
factual information” test. The Supreme Court in future cases, and lower
courts as well, may conclude that NIFLA’s holding rested on the Court’s
finding that the disclosure was not about the terms of the services offered by
the clinics and that its reference to abortion as “anything but an
uncontroversial topic” was merely dicta.338
CONCLUSION
Mandatory disclosures are increasingly used as a regulatory tool,339 but
the constitutionality of these requirements is unsettled. Recent developments
in First Amendment doctrine, including a growing attentiveness to
commercial speakers’ autonomy rights, pose a significant obstacle to
governments seeking to promote public health through disclosures. The
Court’s position in NIFLA, that mandatory disclosures are not eligible for
Zauderer review if they touch on a controversial subject matter, may prove
particularly problematic. But if lower courts read NIFLA as establishing a
“highly controversial subject matter” standard and then give content to that
standard, the impact of NIFLA may be mitigated.
Factual accuracy provides an even more appropriate limit on Zauderer’s
scope than “highly controversial subject matter.” Public health issues are
often the topic of intense political debate, but information about health risks
is extremely important to consumers, as “information can save lives.”340
Zauderer was firmly grounded in listeners’ interests in receiving factual
information about a commercial speaker’s goods or services. As long as the
mandated information is “factual,” the commercial speaker has a minimal
interest in not providing it to consumers. Only if the government attempts to
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra note 185.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 270–71.
See supra text accompanying note 272.
See supra text accompanying notes 175–76.
See supra note 12.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
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compel a commercial speaker to convey opinion—for example, where the
disclosure is a value judgment or is not supported by the weight of scientific
research—should heightened scrutiny apply. While concerns about the
salience of disclosures are well-founded, this issue may be addressed by
evaluating whether a particular disclosure fails Zauderer review as
“unjustified or unduly burdensome.” This framework for compelled
disclosures is more strongly supported by the text of Zauderer itself, and
would grant proper deference to a legislature’s policy determination that the
potential health risks justify a disclosure.

